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Why Contempt Is Different:
Agency Costs and "Petty Crime" in
Summary Contempt Proceedings
E~ric Fleisig-Greene
A court without [the contempti power would be at best a mere
debating society, and not a court.... It is, and must be, a power
arbitrary in its nature, and summary in its execution. It is, perhaps,
nearest akin to despotic power of any power existing under our
form of government.
1
When the responsibilities of lawmaker, prosecutor, judge, jury
and disciplinarian are thrust upon a judge [in a contempt
proceeding,] he is obviously incapable of holding the scales of
justice perfectly fair and true and reflecting impartially on the guilt




For as long as they have existed, contempt proceedings have been the
source of significant controversy, their necessity and abuse hotly contested
by the legal community, the legislature, and the judiciary. The raw,
unchecked power of summary contempt-the ability of a judge to imprison
an individual instantaneously without trial, hearing, or counsel-is arguably
a discretionary authority of unparalleled magnitude. At the same time, such
1. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 193, 194-95 (Wis. 1897).
2. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 199 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
3. For historical examples of such an exercise of power, see Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488,
491 n.2 (1974); Illinois v. Alien, 397 U.S. 337, 353-55 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring in the
result); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 375-89 (7th Cir. 1972); and Robert Allen Sedler, The
Summary Contempt Power and the Constitution: The View from Without and Within, 51 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 34, 56-58 (1976).
In addition to the judiciary, Congress is also able to exercise the contempt power to maintain
control over its proceedings. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 225-30 (1821)
(upholding the contempt power as one essential to the functioning of the House of
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authority has also been hailed as indispensable to the judiciary's function as
an effective arbiter and administrator of the law.4 Given these polar traits of
summary contempt, it is not surprising that the legitimacy and scope of the
contempt power was once a topic of heated debate as well as intense
academic and political scrutiny. In 1963, just five years before the Supreme
Court handed down the last of a series of landmark contempt decisions in
Bloom v. Illinois,5 one author described contempt as "a volatile, focal point
of significant and timely political issues" that had been "the vehicle for
deciding a variety of dramatic and significant social problems."6
But in the three and a half decades following Bloom-a decision that
guaranteed a jury trial for any direct criminal contempt7 with a term of
imprisomnent greater than six months-the issue of contempt has gradually
Representatives); see also 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2000) (authorizing a penalty of $100 to $1000
and one to twelve months' imprisonment, upon indictment by a grand jury, for failing to testify or
produce evidence before Congress). However, given that the scope of congressional proceedings
is limited to a far smaller pool of individuals than that of the courts, contempt of Congress-while
theoretically a power equal in magnitude to contempt of court-is arguably a far less worrisome
incarnation of the contempt power.
4. Such a view seems to have originated in an unpublished opinion of the British judge John
Eardley Wilmot, which stated that contempt "is a necessary Incident to every Court of Justice."
JOHN EARDLEY WILMOT, NOTES OF OPINIONS AND JUDGEMENTS DELIVERED IN DIFFERENT
COURTS 254 (London, Luke Hansard 1802). Blackstone appears to have been influenced by
Wilmot's view when he wrote about the contempt power in his Commentaries. JOHN C. Fox, THE
HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE FORM OF TRIAL AND THE MODE OF PUNISHMENT 21
(1927). For more on the necessity of summary contempt, see infra Part IV.
5. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
6. RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 5 (1963).
7. The boundaries between different types of contempt of court have never been completely
settled, and it is not within the scope of this Note to do so. For an excellent overview of what is
acknowledged to be a "hodgepodge of case law, constitutional law, and statutory regulation [that]
has yielded no unified structure," see Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL
L. REV. 183, 282 (1971).
For the purposes of this Note, the current definition of "direct criminal contempt" should
suffice. "Direct" refers to geographical context. Direct (as opposed to indirect) contempt consists
of "misbehavior in the vicinity of the court disrupting to quiet and order or actually interrupting
the court in the conduct of its business." Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941). In federal
court, a contempt must be committed in the actual presence of the court and be seen by the
presiding judge in order to merit summary adjudication. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). The interpretation
of what constitutes direct contempt, however, was not always as restrictive as this current
definition. See infra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
"Criminal" refers to the "character and purpose" for which the contempt sanction is imposed:
Criminal (as opposed to civil) contempt is punitive, and is imposed "to vindicate the authority of
the court." Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). For background on
the historical development of the criminal-civil distinction (as well as a short argument for the
necessity of summary process for direct criminal contempt), see Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Contempt of
Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARV. L. REV. 161 (1908).
Although many of the arguments made throughout this Note might be applied to other
categories of contempt, the differences are significant enough to merit the exclusion of those
categories from this Note's discussion. For convenience, this Note will refer throughout to
"contempt," but unless otherwise stated will mean only direct criminal contempt. More
specifically, it will refer only to contempt that would serve as grounds for summary adjudication
of guilt-in the federal system, only those occurring in court and in the sight of the presiding
judge.
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disappeared from judicial and academic discourse. 8 This lack of modem-
day discussion should not be taken as a sign that the contempt power is no
longer exercised: It may rather evince a widespread acceptance that Bloom
achieved the proper balance for contempt by placing it on the same footing
as other crimes.
The true reach of summary contempt in today's court system is
impossible to determine, in great part due to the very opacity of its
procedures. Because summary contempt, by its very nature, does not
involve a prosecutor, does not fall under the federal sentencing guidelines,
and is adjudicated without any published ruling and often without the
defendant ever leaving the courtroom, 9 sources of judicial statistics that
might otherwise be expected to provide data on criminal proceedings are
unavailing in determining the extent of the judiciary's use of summary
contempt1l The single collected source of reporting on contempt-
8. A brief resurgence of interest in contempt scholarship occurred in the mid-1990s with the
Supreme Court's decision in International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 US. 821
(1994). See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines
Clause, 76 N.C. L. REV. 407 (1998); Gino F. Ercolino, Comment, United Mine Workers v.
Bagwell: Further Clarification of Civil and Criminal Contempt?, 22 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
Civ. CONFINEMENT 291 (1996); Philip A. Hostak, Note, International Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell: A Paradigm Shift in the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 181 (1995). But this scholarship focused mostly on the civil-criminal
distinction in contempt and not on direct criminal contempt the subject of this Note. This is the
sole exception to what has otherwise been a sharp and steady decline in both judicial and
academic attention to contempt over the past thirty years.
9. Federal judges, for example, are required to do nothing more than produce an order of
contempt certifying the underlying facts and enter the contempt on the record. FED. R. CRIM. P.
42(a).
10. Such sources include the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, the Executive Office for the United States Attorneys, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, and the United States Sentencing Commission, all of which lack any data on summary
contempt proceedings.
What may still be somewhat helpful for gauging the incidence of contempt are statistics on
jury-tried criminal contempts. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics-using data from the
Executive Office for the United States Attorneys-I 51 defendants had criminal cases filed against
them in U.S. district court for contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 in 2001. FED. JUSTICE STATISTICS
PROGRAM, DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT, FISCAL YEAR
2001, at http://fjsrc.urban.org/noframe/wqs/qfdata l.htm#2001 (under "2001: AOUSC in"
hyperlink followed by "Offenses: FTSECMO" hyperlink). Similarly, 97 such cases were
concluded in U.S. district court in 2001: 12 sets of charges were dismissed or declined by the
prosecutor, 1 resulted in a mistrial, 63 defendants pled guilty, 17 pled nolo contendere, and 4 were
convicted or found guilty or insane. FED. JUSTICE STATISTICS PROGRAM, DEFENDANTS IN
CRIMINAL CASES TERMINATING IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT, FISCAL YEAR 2001, at
http://fjsrc.urban.org/noframe/wqs/q_data I.htm#2001 (under "2001: AOUSC out" hyperlink
followed by "Offenses: TTSECMO" hyperlink). Given these numbers, and given also the fact that
federal courts (from which these statistics are drawn) hear only 0.4% of all criminal prosecutions
across the country, the number of jury-tried direct criminal contempts is certainly significant.
Compare NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2001, at 138,
at http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2001_Files/2001 SCCS.html (finding at least
14,532,895 criminal cases filed in state courts in 2000), with STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 65 (2001) (finding 62,585 criminal
cases originated in U.S. district courts in the year ending March 31, 2001), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2001/contents.html.
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appellate cases reviewing lower court contempt proceedings-may thus
vastly understate the procedure's true prevalence in the judicial system. But
even in the underrepresentative pool of appellate court decisions, it is clear
that summary contempt is alive and well: Recent cases demonstrate that
such simple provocations as an off-color remark,' 1 a late request for a jury
trial,12 or merely staunch advocacy 3 run the risk of costing an alleged
contemnor a hefty fine or up to a half a year of his freedom. As these cases
show, the exercise of the contempt power lives on, and with it questions of
judicial bias and unchecked self-dealing--questions that Bloom, this Note
argues, failed to address adequately.
This Note seeks to reopen the discussion and pick up where Bloom left
off, by reconsidering the right to a jury trial in contempt-of-court
proceedings. More specifically, the following pages address whether and in
what instances the right to trial by jury is constitutionally guaranteed to
those accused of direct criminal contempt. It is the thesis of this Note that
the current doctrine, founded upon the Court's opinion in Bloom, provides
insufficient constitutional safeguards for such contemnors. Contempt
proceedings differ from ordinary crimes: They raise unique concerns of
impartiality and separation of powers that the jury was designed to address.
By analogizing contempt to other crimes, and by extending to contempt
proceedings the "petty crimes" analysis that underlies the right to a jury
trial in criminal cases, the current doctrine loses sight of the purpose behind
Whether the number of summary contempts is greater than that of contempt prosecutions is
indeterminate. On the one hand, the specific circumstances required for contempt to be
adjudicated summarily may suggest that the number of summary contempts is lower than those
tried either by jury or judge. On the other hand, once such circumstances are satisfied, the
distinction between tried and summary contempts turns primarily on the choice of the judge (by
selecting whether the proposed sentence will be less than six months). As a result, given that there
are greater administrative and judicial hurdles to tried contempt than to summary contempt, it is
likely that judges more frequently choose the latter than the former. If so, it may be reasonable to
use the number of contempt prosecutions as a rough-and perhaps even conservative-estimate
of the prevalence of summarily adjudicated contempt.
11. Commonwealth v. Williams, 753 A.2d 856 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); State v. Dubray, 618
N.W.2d 728 (S.D. 2000). Williams is a particularly insightful example of the contempt power's
potential for abuse in the hands of an angered and creative judge. Williams raised his middle
finger in the court's direction and uttered the usual profanity to accompany such a gesture. The
court held Williams in contempt for two separate acts-the finger-raising and the utterance-with
a sentence of five months and twenty-nine days for each act, to be served consecutively. The
resulting sentence of almost a full year's imprisonment was vacated by the superior court, and
only one of the two contempt charges was remanded: The two acts were so inextricably
intertwined, held the court, as to constitute only a single contumacious act. Williams, 753 A.2d at
864-65.
12. Commonwealth v. Odom, 764 A.2d 53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (reversing a district court
finding of contempt-and a five-month, twenty-nine-day sentence-based on the defendant's
request for a jury trial on the day of trial, prompted by his prior miscommunication and
disagreement with appointed counsel).
13. In re Marriage of Bartlett, 711 N.E.2d 460 (I11. App. Ct. 1999) (reversing the contempt
conviction of an attorney who persisted in arguing a motion after the court insisted that the issue
was closed and that the attorney step away).
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the guarantees of jury trial found in Article III of the Constitution' 4 and the
Sixth Amendment.15 Alluring though the "petty crimes" analysis for the
right to a jury trial may be, Bloom's application of that standard to contempt
proceedings was erroneous, and the historical record of both the jury right
and the contempt power support a more limited scope of summary
adjudication than that standard provides. Accordingly, this Note strives to
present a new framework within which to conceive of the right to jury trial
in contempt proceedings-a framework that is more consistent with both
the history of the contempt power and the theory behind the limits on jury
trial for ordinary crimes.
To present and justify such a framework, this Note proceeds in four
parts. Part I discusses the role of the jury, examining historical sources to
demonstrate that one of the jury's primary purposes was to act as a guard
against consolidated power, corruption, and self-dealing. As the political
discussion surrounding Article III and the Sixth Amendment demonstrates,
a central function of the jury was to align incentives of the judiciary with
those of the citizenry from which it derived its authority-to act as a
solution to what is now commonly known as the "principal-agent problem."
By permitting the "principal" to make decisions when the stakes were high,
the jury ensured that the judiciary was accountable to the people it
purported to serve. For the same reason, juries were deemed unnecessary
when the potential for judicial self-dealing and the stakes of adjudication
were both low: There was no right to a jury trial when the offense was a
"petty crime" that did not affect the judge and that carried a relatively
minor punishment.
Part 1I considers why, given the functional role of the jury outlined in
Part I, contempt is different from other crimes for the purposes of the right
to a jury trial. Although the punishments for contempt and ordinary crimes
may be analogous, the incentives for judges in both instances are not.
Contempt provides a greater temptation for judges to deviate from the will
of the citizenry, and accordingly generates greater agency costs than do
other crimes.
Part III discusses why this difference matters from the perspective of
the right to a jury trial. Combining the analysis in Parts I and II, it
concludes that summary adjudication of contempt, if allowed at all, should
be more limited in scope than the current doctrine requires. To supplement
this critique, Part IV proposes a number of potential means by which the
conclusions of Part III might be implemented. Although the appropriate
balance between summary contempt and jury trials may be impossible to
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The trial of all Crimes... shall be by Jury . .
15. Id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed .... )
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determine, the summary contempt power as it currently stands is
unjustifiable in its breadth. Accordingly, this final Part offers possible
solutions to achieve a more appropriate standard for the adjudication of
contempt and considers the costs of such solutions.
Part IV concludes with a discussion of the practical difficulties of
implementing any possible solutions to the current, erroneous doctrine
surrounding contempt. In so doing, it provides a final illustration of how the
same judicial self-dealing that makes current contempt doctrine
inappropriate has also historically acted to prevent its correction-whether
attempted through legislative, executive, or judicial channels.
I. THE ROLE OF THE JURY: REVIVING THE
"PRINCIPAL" IN THE JUDICIARY
A. The Jury's Political Function
There can be little doubt as to the high regard in which the Founders
held the right to a jury trial. That the typical colonist placed significant
value on this "grand bulwark of his liberties"' 6 is clear: Not only was the
right to a jury trial cited among the causes for the American Revolution1
7
and among the constitutional guarantees of the fledgling nation that
emerged thereafter,'8 but it was also the moving force behind the Bill of
16. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *342; see also 3 id. at *379-81. Blackstone's
praise of the jury no doubt influenced the Founders' thoughts on its necessity and virtues.
Invocation of Blackstone in the arguments over the nature and extent of the jury right abound.
See, e.g., Essay by a Farmer (June 6, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
212, 213-14 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); Letter from Centinel to the People of Pennsylvania
(1788), reprinted in 2 id. at 143, 149; Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund
Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787), reprinled in 5 id. at 112, 114; A Review of the Constitution Proposed
by the Late Convention by a Federal Republican (Oct. 28, 1787), reprinted in 3 id. at 65, 77.
17. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776). Even prior to the
American colonies' decision to sever ties with Great Britain, the Continental Congress had
invoked the right to trial by jury. In a 1774 letter to Quebec, the Congress cited trial by jury as one
of the "invaluable rights" denied under British rule. Invoking the name of Montesquieu, the
Congress urged Quebec to join the American colonies in opposition to Great Britain. Letter to the
Inhabitants of Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774), reprinted in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 105, 105-13 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904). Although Quebec declined the
offer, the letter's mention of jury trial as one of only five rights "without which a people cannot be
free and happy," id. at 107-08, further underscores the importance of the jury in the minds of the
colonists.
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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Rights 19 and the source of a prodigious number of pamphlets, speeches,
debates, and other writings during the Founding era.20
What is somewhat less clear, however, is the precise reason-or
reasons-why early America held the jury in such high regard.
Explanations of the merits and necessity of jury trials abound,2' but of
particular importance was the functional role of the jury as a way to assure
that the judiciary remained accountable to, and aligned with, the interests of
the citizenry it purported to serve.22 As witnessed by both writings of the
Revolutionary era and the implementation of jury trials in the colonies and
newly formed states, this function was particularly salient in the minds of
those responsible for codifying the American right to trial by jury. For
them, the jury was a simple solution to the classic problem of misaligned
incentives between a principal and his agent-in this case, between the
citizenry and the judiciary. The jury was a method of "reviving the
principal" in judicial decisions that were either too important or too
tempting for relatively unsupervised 23 agents-i.e., judges-to make.
19. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83 (1998) ("[T]he entire debate at the
Philadelphia convention over whether to add a Bill of Rights was triggered when George Mason
picked up on a casual comment from another delegate that 'no provision was yet made for juries
in civil cases."').
20. For a collection of many of these writings, see THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 16; THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993); and THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
21. For a detailed summary of arguments both for and against juries, see Recording of Jury
Deliberations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. To Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong.
63-81 (1955) (statement of Harry Kalven, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Chicago). Among
the twenty arguments Professor Kalven put forth in favor of the jury, the first two were its effect
against bias and self-dealing and its ability to integrate the values of the community into the
judicial branch. Id. at 64-65. For additional sources in the years since Professor Kalven's
testimony, see Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 443-45 nn.2-5 (1997).
22. For a particularly rich description of this role of the jury-as well as its place in the Bill
of Rights-see AMAR, supra note 19, at 81-118. See also Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G.
Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L_ REV. 867 (1994)
(conceiving of the jury as both a structural protection against government and a democratic
institution, but noting the declining effectiveness of the jury in the former role as it more strongly
embraces the latter); Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and
Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 733 (1993) (listing "protecting individual rights
against an abusive government" as one of the goals of the jury); Note, The Changing Role of the
Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964) (painting the jury as a fusion of
democracy and structural protections against government); Alan Howard Schemer, Note, Judicial
Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 142 (1991) (citing the jury as a means to prevent legislative tyranny and to offset
judicial bias toward governmental interests).
23. At least in theory, federal judges were always subject to the supervision and sanction of
impeachment. Many critics of the Constitution, however, were skeptical of impeachment as an
effective sanction of the judiciary. See, e.g., Essay of Brutus (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 16, at 437, 440; Letter from the Federal Farmer (Jan.
14, 1788), reprinted in 2 id. at 301, 305. Others, by contrast, were concerned that impeachment
would become a means of further corruption, by providing a tool for legislative control of the
Executive. See, e.g., Samuel Spencer, Speech to the North Carolina Convention (July 28, 1788),
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It is understandable why the Founders desired such a check upon their
newly established courts. Recent oppression under the yoke of British law
had made them wary of the judiciary, and particularly cognizant of the need
to align judges' incentives with those of the citizens over whom they
presided. The Stamp Act, for example, was enforced by the British
admiralty courts-courts in which there was no right to jury trial. Colonists'
experience with the Act made them inherently suspicious of adjudication
severed from popular authority. Accordingly, when the colonists petitioned
King George III for relief, they complained that they had been "subjected to
the Determination of a single Judge" and requested that the "essential" right
of trial by jury be reinstated to protect colonists from "Arbitrary Decisions
of the executive Power."
2 4
British rule thus gave rise to a deep suspicion of the judicial branch. In
Massachusetts, for example, one speaker empathized with a crowd's
hostility toward the judiciary:
When you came to have leisure to consider, who was on this side,
and who on that, of the important question [of whether to continue
to obey the authority of Great Britain]; you unluckily found the
greater number of those gentlemen, whom you had been wont to
revere as makers of the law, the judges of law, the pleaders of law,
in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 879, 881 (arguing that the mandate to
try impeachments, when combined with other aspects of the Senate's authority, provides the
Senate "at once with such an enormity of power, and with such an overbearing and uncontroulable
influence, as is incompatible with every idea of safety to the liberties of a free country, and is
calculated to swallow up all other powers, and to render that body a despotic aristocracy"); cf
George Mason, Objections to the Constitution, reprinted in I id. at 345, 346-47 (expressing
concern that the trial of impeachments, when complemented by the rest of the Senate's powers,
"will destroy any balance in the government, and enable [Senators] to accomplish what
usurpations they please upon the rights and liberties of the people").
History has shown the skeptics of impeachment's effectiveness to be closer to the truth.
Impeachment has generally been an empty threat to the judiciary, even for some of the most
egregious abuses of judicial power. Circuit Justice Samuel Chase, acknowledged to be one of the
worst offenders of the rule of judicial independence for his handling of criminal trials under the
Sedition Acts of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, was impeached, but was acquitted on all eight articles
of impeachment by the Senate, with votes ranging from unanimity on one charge to a 19-15 vote
in favor of guilt on another. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 665-69 (1805). The same is true of Judge James
Peck, whose flagrant abuse of the contempt power led to an 1831 act of Congress, An Act
Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts of Court, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487 (1831), which was the
first narrowing of the contempt power since its codification in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1
Stat. 73. Like Chase, Peck was impeached, but the Senate would not vote to convict. Over the
entire history of the judiciary, only twelve federal judges have been impeached by the House; only
seven were subsequently convicted by the Senate. Senate Trial History, USA TODAY, Jan. 4,
1999, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/clinton/clin893.htm.
24. Petition to the King (1765), reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764-1766, at 63, 64-65 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959);
see also Declaration on Taking Arms (Thomas Jefferson's First Draft), in .2 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 128, 132-33 (decrying how Parliament has "extended
the jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty beyond their antient limits thereby depriving us of the
inestimable right of trial by jury in cases affecting both life and property and subjecting both to
the decision arbitrary decision [sic] of a single and dependent judge").
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and the executors of law, were, contrary to the law of nature, reason
and humanity, taking party with the tyrant, and endeavoring to fix
his hateful chains upon you. This circumstance, in addition to your
former prejudice against law, excited an undue jealosy and hatred
against all those men who have since been appointed to administer,
or have attempted to introduce, law into the county.
25
This inherent distrust of the machinations of government-and
particularly of a distant, federal government-led the drafters of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights to search for ways to incorporate popular
checks into the structure of the Union. For the judiciary, the need was
particularly acute: As opposed to legislators or the Executive, who served
limited terms and were elected (directly or indirectly) by the people
themselves, the courts were manned by political appointees whose offices
were not jeopardized by deviance from the popular will.26 The jury was thus
a political tool for popular control of the judiciary-for making it an
accountable (and thus legitimate) political body in the new republican
government.27 It provided the primary assurance that application of the laws
would remain under the control of the people, rather than in the hands of
the privileged and unassailable few.28 When it was likely that the interests
25. William Whiting, An Address to the Inhabitants of Berkshire County, Massachusetts
(1778), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 461, 464
(Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
26. Madison himself acknowledged that the judiciary was particularly likely to be beyond the
influences of the populace. Judges, he wrote, "by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the
nature and permanency of it, are too far removed from the people to share much in their
prepossessions." THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 284 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999);
see also Essay by a Farmer (Mar. 21, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 16, at 36, 38 (calling the jury "the democratic branch of judiciary power-more
necessary than representatives in the legislature").
The isolation of the judiciary from the everyday inspection and regulation of the populace
was also problematic for another reason. Abuses of power were less likely to be discovered in the
individual rulings of judges than in the more general edicts of legislatures or executives:
When the legislature makes a bad law, or the first executive magistrates usurp upon the
rights of the people, they discover the evil much sooner, than the abuses of power in the
judicial department; the proceedings of which are far more intricate, complex, and out
of their immediate view. A bad law immediately excites a general alarm; a bad judicial
determination, though not less pernicious in its consequences, is immediately felt,
probably, by a single individual only ....
Letter from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 id. at 315, 316.
27. Alexis de Tocqueville, in his classic study of American society, commented on the jury's
political-and populist-function: To him, the jury was "above all a political institution" and
"eminently republican." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 124 (Sanford
Kessler ed. & Stephen D, Grant trans., 2000) (1835). He also explicitly compared the control
mechanism of the jury to that of popular elections: "The system of the jury... appears to me to be
a consequence of the dogma of the sovereignty of the people that is as direct and as extreme as
universal suffrage. These are two equally powerful means of ensuring the predominance of the
majority." Id. at 125; see also Essay by Hampden (Jan. 26, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 16, at 198, 200 ("[T]he inestimable right of a trial by jury . is the
democratical balance in the Judiciary power ... ").
28. As one commentator at the time of the Founding argued:
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of the people and those of the courts would diverge, the right to a jury trial
existed to ensure that the former would prevail: It was a way in which the
"principal" could be revived in judicial decisionmaking, when the costs of
entrusting "agents" were too great.29
B. The Jury's Historical Use
This functional role of the jury as a means of judicial control is further
supported by the history of jury trial in early America. Despite provisions in
state constitutions that unequivocally guaranteed a universal right to trial by
jury, colonial and state statutes around the time of the Founding provided
no such right for so-called "petty crimes"-minor offenses that were
sometimes punishable by up to six months' imprisonment.3 ° From
The trial by jury... is essential in every free country, that common people should have
a part and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the legislative department....
The few, the well born, etc. as Mr. Adams calls them, in judicial decisions as well as in
legislation, are generally disposed, and very naturally too, to favour those of their own
description.
Letter from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 16, at 245, 249; see also Essay of an Old Whig (1787-1788), reprinted in
3 id. at 46, 49 ("Judges, unincumbered by juries, have been ever found much better friends to
government than to the people.").
29. For example, the people were protected from the caprices of judicial agents through the
jury's use of general verdicts, which by their very nature could not be questioned by judges on
appeal:
[B]y holding the jury's right to return a general verdict in all cases sacred, we secure to
the people at large, their just and rightful control in the judicial department. If the
conduct of judges shall be severe and arbitrary, and tend to subvert the laws, and
change the forms of government, the jury may check them, by deciding against their
opinions and determinations ....
Letter from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 id. at 315, 320 (emphasis added);
see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 & n.23 (1968) (supporting the jury as a right
granted "in order to prevent oppression by the [g]overnment"); id. at 157 ("[W]hen juries differ
with the result at which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some
of the very purposes for which they were created ... ").
30. Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 934-65, 980-81 (1926). The proposal that
"petty crimes" are not subject to the right to a jury trial has not gone uncontested. See, e.g.,
George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 245 (1959). Kaye argues that
the state jury clauses on which Frankfurter and Corcoran rely are not comparable to Article Ill and
the Sixth Amendment because some were not popularly ratified while others were limited to
prosecutions by indictment and information. As a result, Kaye claims that these state clauses are
inapposite to the federal Constitution's universal guarantee of trial by jury. See also Timothy
Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7, 10 (1994) (arguing
for a literal and liberal reading of the jury clauses, and for the "burden of persuasion" to lie on
those who would read the clauses in a more restrictive fashion).
It is not within the scope of this Note to determine whether Frankfurter and Corcoran's thesis
is beyond reproach. It is sufficient that, be it correct or incorrect, the current Court's petty crimes
doctrine relies upon and parallels its analysis. Because this Note seeks to address contradictions of
the law as it currently stands, it will leave the issue of the general appropriateness of the petty
crimes doctrine for another day.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112:12231232
Why Contempt Is Different
drunkenness to Sabbath-breaking, numerous criminal offenses were tried by
judges, and not by juries.
31
If the jury were an end unto itself, this practice would be
incomprehensible. But when trial by jury is understood as an instrumental
right-one that is only needed to make judicial agents accountable to their
populist principals-its limited use makes perfect sense. If judges'
incentives deviate from those of the populace at a constant rate across all
crimes, and the only distinction between petty crimes and other offenses is
that the former carry lesser punishments, it makes sense that jury trials
might not be guaranteed for all legal infractions. Under such a system, in
cases where the stakes (i.e., the potential punishments) are small, and thus
the costs of judges' possible deviance are similarly low, the jury's watchful
eye is unnecessary and perhaps more costly than it is worth.33
This is not to say that fear of judicial deviance was the only justification
for the jury's adoption and subsequent growth in American history. But this
historical evidence does convey that the concern was certainly prominent in
the Framers' minds when Article III and the Sixth Amendment were
adopted, and-more importantly for the purposes of this Note-that this
justification was the one that underlay the distinction between petty and
serious crimes when it was first implemented during colonial times.
Certainly, there were (and still are) other benefits that have come to be
associated with the jury: It has been forwarded as a forum in which to
educate the citizenry, as a way to reinforce and reap the benefits of a
pluralistic society, as a guard against the unresponsiveness of precedent,
and even as a means of fostering attachment and obedience to the laws
themselves. But while all of these benefits may also accompany the use of
the jury in criminal trials, none can serve as a rational justification to treat
crimes with lesser punishments in a distinct manner from those with greater
ones. Both logically and historically, the jury's role as a check on judicial
31. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 30.
32. But see infra Part II.
33. Let S be the stakes of a given decision (i.e., the length of potential imprisonment, or the
magnitude of a potential fine), and let D be the probability that the "principal" (i.e., ajury) and the
"agent" (i.e., a judge) will disagree and reach different conclusions between two alternatives
(guilty or not guilty). The expected cost of assigning the decision to a judge rather than to a jury
will be SD: the cost of an "error" (where the judge and jury disagree on the verdict) multiplied by
the probability of such an error. If we assume D to be constant across all crimes, the expected
costs of assigning a decision to a judge will vary only with the potential punishment (S) that a
crime carries. If the costs are low enough, the populace may be willing to permit a judge to make
decisions without the involvement of a jury; the instrumental value of the jury becomes de
minimis. At the time of the Founding, it seems that when S was less than six months'
imprisonment, the expected costs resulting from judges' deviance in ordinary crimes were not
considered sufficient to merit a jury trial. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 192 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("The reason for the historic exception for relatively minor crimes is the obvious one: the burden
of jury trial was thought to outweigh its marginal advantages."). Harlan agreed with the Court on
this point; he dissented for another reason-namely, because he believed the states should be
doing the calculus, rather than the Court. Id. at 192-93.
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deviance was the foundation for the distinct treatment of petty crimes, and
that role has continued to underlie the distinction to this day. Accordingly,
it is this same role that must be considered when determining the extent to
which jury trial is appropriate for contempt proceedings as well.
The petty-serious distinction found its way into judicial doctrine in the
late nineteenth century34 and was applied to the states in 1968. 35 Implicit in
these cases was the recognition that the jury's protections were needed only
when the stakes of conviction were sufficiently high: For the Court's
calculus, the only relevant difference among crimes was their gravity.
Accordingly, on the day that the Court required states to try serious crimes
by jury, it also decided in Bloom v. Illinois3 6 that the same requirement
would apply to "serious" contempt proceedings.
For both ordinary crimes and contempt, the Court set an identical
threshold of six months for the petty-serious distinction. But the leap from
crimes to contempt, although perhaps logical given the doctrinal
perspective at the time, depended upon the assumption that a crime's
statutory punishment was the only factor relevant to determining whether
jury trial was necessary. 37 This assumption was a flawed one, and as a result
the doctrinal limits on jury trials in contempt proceedings have been flawed
as well.
II. WHY CONTEMPT Is DIFFERENT:
INSTITUTIONAL BIAS AND SELF-DEALING
For almost a century prior to Bloom, the judiciary had dealt with
questions of what constitutional rights, if any, were guaranteed in contempt
proceedings."' To answer these questions, the Court had focused on what it
deemed to be the central issue-whether contempt was a crime or simply an
exercise of the inherent functions of the judiciary. In many contexts this
focus was not unreasonable, and the vast majority of the constitutional
guarantees that were extended to contempt hinged solely on such a
34. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888).
35. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
36. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
37. The justification for extending the jury right to criminal contempt was one of analogy,
supported by the fact that potential criminal sanctions for contempt were similar to those for
ordinary crimes:
Our experience teaches that convictions for criminal contempt, not infrequently
resulting in extremely serious penalties, are indistinguishable from those obtained
under ordinary criminal laws. If the right to jury trial is a fundamental matter in other
criminal cases, which we think it is, it must also be extended to criminal contempt
cases.
Id. at 207-08 (citation omitted).
38. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 87 U.S. 387 (1874).
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distinction. 39 But once it was settled that contempt was a crime, inquiry into
the nature of contempt was treated as closed. Consequently, the Court lost
sight of the fact that contempt is, in fact, fundamentally different from
ordinary crimes in a way that is integral to the functional role of the jury:
Contempt provides incentives and opportunities for judicial self-dealing
that ordinary crimes do not.
A. Contempt as an Extension of the Court
Contempt is, by its very nature, an affront to the judiciary and its
administration of justice: It is an attack upon the institution of which the
judge is keeper and administrator.40 Despite Justice Holmes's assertion that
"[tihe court is not a party" in contempt actions,4' the institutional integrity
and power of the judiciary is tied up in the exercise of the contempt power.
Even if "rt]here is nothing that affects the judges in their own persons"
when contempt is committed before the court,42 there is an inherent interest
of the judge in the outcome of a contempt proceeding. Just as a mayor who
gets a fee for a conviction 43-- or even just funding for his villagea4-has
incentives to deviate from the will of the citizenry, so, too, does a judge
whose decision affects the scope of judicial power and, by extension, the
power he will wield in his office.45 Because the limits of judicial power are
39. See, e.g., In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943) (extending the prohibition against double
jeopardy to criminal contempt); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911)
(extending the privilege against self-incrimination, presumption of innocence, and standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to criminal contempt).
40. "Even when the contempt is not a direct insult to the court or the judge, it frequently
represents a rejection of judicial authority, or an interference with the judicial process or with the
duties of officers of the court." Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202; see also 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
41. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 574 (1906).
42. Id.
43. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). The argument for judicial neutrality in Tumey
is found as far back as Lord Coke's decision in Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.
1610). Although the case is probably best known for its principles of judicial review and the
common law's supremacy over legislation, it also held that "quia aliquis non debet esse Judex in
propria causa" (one ought not to be the judge in one's own cause). Id. at 652.
44. See Ward v. Viii. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
45. While a financial interest in the outcome of a case may be different from an institutional
interest, the distinction is one of degree, not of kind. Cf Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911
(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Although the Court does not provide
explanations for denials of certiorari, the dissent by Justice Breyer-itself somewhat of an
anomaly-suggested that the Court refused to hear a case regarding judges' salaries because it
would "face the serious embarrassment of deciding a matter that would directly affect [its] own
pocketbooks." Id. at 919. The media coverage supported this interpretation of why the Court
refused to hear the case. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Despite Complaining About Pay, Justices
Won't Review a Ruling Thai Blocks Raises, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002, at A21; Tony Mauro, The
Judicial Pay Issue Is Now in Congress' Court, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 11, 2002, at A8. Note that Justice
Breyer's reason for why the Court should take the casc-that there was no one else to decide it if
the Court could not-does not apply to the choice between summary contempt and a jury trial.
Williams, 535 U.S. at 919.
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outlined in part by the relative success with which a contempt proceeding
can be brought, the incentives for a judge-an agent and administrator of
the court-to find against the contemnor differ fundamentally from those of
the citizenry.46
This integral link between the judiciary and contempt has often been
cited in support of the summary contempt power: It has been asserted that
without such power, a court would be unable to carry out its adjudicative
functions.4 7 Certainly, some minimum ability to maintain order, be it
through contempt or other means, is necessary for the functioning of a court
or any other institution. But at the same time, the degree to which such a
power is needed is by no means clear. By placing discretion solely in the
hands of judges, summary contempt invites them to err on the side of
expanding the power of the institution that grants them control, even at the
expense of the rights of those appearing before the court a.4  The incentives
of the people, who have no such vested interest in expansion of the judicial
power, are thus divorced from those of judges in contempt proceedings.
This divergence of motives between judges and citizens sets contempt apart
from other types of crimes, in which such a divergence cannot be expected
to exist.
46. Although it is certainly true that "'the power [judges] exercise is but the authority of the
people themselves, exercised through courts as their agents,"' United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S.
681, 700 (1964) (quoting Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341 (1858)), this does not alter the
fact that judges-when the institution that is the source of their power is threatened-may act as
imperfect agents of the people, from whom they derive their authority.
Indeed, there have been arguments to eliminate the contempt power on the ground that it
violates the Due Process Clause's guarantee of impartial adjudication. See, e.g., Sedler, supra note
3 (arguing that the process for contempt is inherently biased, since judges cannot help but be
affected by an assault upon the court). But this argument proves too much: If the very notion of
summary contempt violates the requirements of due process, one must wonder why the
Founders-at a time when distrust of the judiciary was arguably at its zenith-permitted the
process at all. Potential deviance of judges' motives is certainly a concern in contempt actions, but
the history of contempt in America suggests a certain degree of tolerance for summary contempt
proceedings. See infra Part III. The concern surrounding summary contempt was-and remains-
a concern relative to other crimes, and one that can be seen most clearly through the jury
requirement of Article III and the Sixth Amendment.
47. See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text; supra note 4 and accompanying text.
48. This is not to imply that a majority-or even a substantial minority-of judges actually
abuse the contempt power. Rather, the point is that such a power poses unique opportunities and
temptations to judges. Even when such temptations are indulged, the decision to do so may not be
conscious or intentional, but rather a result of the judge's unique perspective that arises from the
administration of a courtroom. But this insular perspective, insofar as it deviates from that of the
people, is one that the jury was designed to eliminate when its costs were sufficiently high. Thus,
the argument is not that judicial deviance in the context of contempt is high in absolute terms, or
that it is intentional or malicious. Rather, it is simply that the potential for such deviance-
however it arises-is relatively higher for contempt than for other crimes.
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B. Contempt as an Opportunity for Unchecked Judicial Expansion
This deviation of judges' incentives is further implicated by the
opportunity that contempt inherently provides for judicial self-dealing.
Because the limits of appropriate circumstances for summary contempt
proceedings are not defined by legislation, but instead by application and
judicial practice, the more broadly the power is used, the greater judicial
power becomes. 49 If, as is only rational for self-serving actors, "judges will
be interested to extend the powers of the courts,"50 contempt provides an
opportune vehicle for such an extension. Because contempt actions are
initiated and adjudicated by the judge alone, there is no representative from
any other branch of government that can intervene: The process of
contempt, from start to finish, is a power vested solely in the judiciary.
51
Furthermore, as the judicial discretion of contempt is reviewable only by
appellate courts, not only is the incentive for deviating from the popular
will stronger, but the opportunity for unchecked self-dealing is stronger as
well. 2 And although the Court has attempted to quell fears of abuse by
49. Although there have been some legislative attempts to narrow the scope of contempt-
usually after extreme abuse of the power in the hands of certain judges-these efforts have been
thwarted by judicial interpretation, as well as by the apparent position of the Court that any
significant restriction upon the contempt power would be unconstitutional. See infra Subsection
IV.C. 1.
50. Essay of Brutus (Jan. 31, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 16, at 417, 422.
51. The Court has recognized that the Executive may pardon contemnors. It is doubtful,
however, whether the Court would continue to do so were the pardon power to be used in a broad
or sweeping manner. See infra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
52. The proposition that self-dealing extends all the way up the appellate ladder is perhaps
best expressed by the Marquis of Lansdown's response to the assertion that the rights of appeal
are the dearest of birthrights:
The marquis ridiculed the declaration.., asserting that it was neither more nor less
than the being taned over from one set of lawyers to another, and from that other to a
third. In fact, it was to be turned over from the judge who tried the cause, to himself
and three others, in a second place; and from them to themselves again, mixed with a
few more judges, in a third place!
29 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR
1803, at 1419 (T.C. Hansard ed., AMS Press 1966) (1817). The deferential standard of review
given to summary adjudications of contempt reinforces this suspicion that appellate courts will
serve only to ratify mistaken judgments at the trial court level. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 943 F.2d 132, 136 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying an "abuse of discretion" standard to the
district court's finding of contempt, and citing other circuits' use of the same standard).
Furthermore, even absent the complicity of appellate courts, the nature of the contempt process is
such that the court record-essentially the only evidence for higher courts to consider on appeal-
may be inadequate to convey the circumstances under which the contempt occurred. As a result,
appeal may be an ineffective means of protection for an unjustly accused contemnor. See In re
Little, 404 U.S. 553, 556 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Those present often have a totally
different impression of the events from what would appear even in a faithful transcript of the
record."). But see Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 517 (1974) ("Summary convictions
during trial that are unwarranted by the facts will not be invulnerable to appellate review.");
United States v. Martin, No. 99-4295, 2001 WL 22910 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 2001) (overturning a
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declaring contempt to be limited to "the least possible power adequate to
the end proposed, 53 the decisions that have followed from such a doctrine
suggest otherwise.
5 4
In sum, contempt is different from ordinary crimes. It provides greater
incentives for judges to deviate from the popular will, and also provides
greater opportunity to do so, vis-A-vis the absence of legislative or
executive checks on the contempt power. Thus, although contempt may
be-and, according to both the Court's jurisprudence and common sense,
is-a crime, it is also substantially different from ordinary crimes. This
difference is particularly relevant when considering how far to extend the
right to a jury trial. As the next Part demonstrates, the Court's current
guidelines-which treat contempt identically to other crimes-are
imperfect as a result.
III. WHY THE DIFFERENCE MATTERS: THE LOST HALF OF THE
PETTY CRIMES DISTINCTION
A. Combining Level of Punishment with a
Greater Probability of Deviance
According to current doctrine, "[c]riminal contempt is a crime in the
ordinary sense."55 As such, a jury trial is required for contempt when it is
"serious," but not when it is "petty." Throughout the evolution of the right
to a jury trial, the Court has drawn this distinction by focusing solely on the
question of stakes and potential consequences of conviction.56 Under this
standard, the right to a jury trial for contempt and for ordinary crimes is
coextensive: Both are considered "serious" once the accused faces a
summary contempt conviction because there was no certification in the record, as required by
Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
53. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821).
54. See, e.g., Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 991 (1997) (reinstating a summary contempt
order that the Ninth Circuit had vacated on the ground that it "went beyond those necessities
pertaining to the ordered administration of justice"); Ruth M. Braswell, Comment, The Role of
Due Process in Summary Contempt Proceedings, 68 IOWA L. REV. 177 (1982). But see Offitt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954) (emphasizing "the importance of [appellate courts] assuring
alert self-restraint in the exercise by district judges of the summary power for punishing
contempt").
55. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
56. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 74-76 (1970) (Black, J., concurring); Frank v.
United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1969); Cheffv. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 393 (1966)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 740 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 194 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). Although the Court has sometimes
stated that the relevant consideration is the "nature of the offense," it has made clear that the
"nature" is only pertinent insofar as it reflects the consequences of conviction-such as stigma or
punishment. See District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930).
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potential punishment in excess of six months' imprisonment. 57 For lesser
terms of punishment, a judge may adjudicate contempt summarily.
58
The extent of the right to a jury trial in contempt proceedings, like
ordinary crimes, is thus dependent only upon the length of the potential
sentence that the contemnor faces, according to current doctrine. In order to
see why this standard is incorrect, it is necessary to recall the reasoning
behind the Founders' insistence on jury trial. The jury right was instituted
as a political tool to ensure that the judiciary, ordinarily entrusted to the
hands of a few judges, would serve the interests of all. When the expected
costs of judge-made decisions were too great, a jury was guaranteed to
ensure that the "correct" decision-the one the people espoused-was
made. These "agency costs" of judges' decisionmaking can arise in two
ways. First, greater stakes would yield greater expected costs: In a case with
grave consequences, even infrequent error might be intolerable. Second, a
greater probability of "incorrect" decisions would also increase expected
costs: The more likely a judge is to diverge from the populace, the greater
the need for a jury.59
The Court's petty crimes doctrine, however, ignores the second of these
factors. By analogizing contempt to ordinary crimes, and making the jury
right coextensive in both cases, the Court has made an important-and
fundamental-error. It has proceeded on the assumption that all crimes
have an equal probability that the judge and the people will have divergent
views. But as Part II demonstrated, the likelihood that a judge will act in his
own interests and deviate from the interests of the polity is increased in the
context of contempt. The Court has ignored a fundamental difference
between contempt and other crimes that is highly relevant to the right to a
jury trial.
The petty-serious distinction recognizes that the stakes of the crime can
be sufficiently large that a consideration of the potential error rate is
irrelevant, and that a jury will be necessary in all such instances." But at
57. Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 511-12; Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 74-76.
58. Summary contempt proceedings are essentially instantaneous rulings by the trial judge.
The judge must enter into the record and issue a signed order of contempt relating the relevant
facts. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). Beyond this, however, summary contempt-at least in
federal court--consists solely of the judge's declaration that the individual is being held in
contempt of court.
59. Using the mathematical notation in note 33, supra, the first of these two factors is S,
while the second is D. Since the expected costs of a judge-made decision are SD, increasing either
of these two factors raises the expected costs of such a decision.
60. Under this scenario, whenever S is large enough (six months' imprisonment, according to
current doctrine), a jury trial is always needed: SD is always significantly large, even for the
smallest D (which would presumably be some baseline chance of deviation between a judge and a
jury). Empirical studies have found the value of D in ordinary criminal and civil cases to be
around twenty percent (compared with fifty percent if the judge and jury were both independently
to flip a coin to decide). See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMFRICAN JURY 58-63,
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the same time it has ignored the fact that, even in punishments of lesser
stakes, the decisionmaking process may be so fraught with potential for
judicial deviance that a jury is necessary to ensure that the will of the
people is administered in the courts.61 If contempts are fundamentally
different from other crimes because judges are more likely to deviate from
the citizenry in such cases, then an identical standard for jury trial in
contempt and other crimes would be inappropriate.
Current doctrine states that "criminal contempt is not a crime of the sort
that requires the right to jury trial regardless of the penalty involved," 62 but
it is not necessary to declare that all contempts require juries. All that one
need recognize is that the risks of judicial self-dealing and bias are higher in
contempts than in other crimes. As a result, a lesser punishment for
contempt may still implicate a jury right, even if the same punishment
would not do so for an ordinary crime. By considering both potential
punishment and potential decision error, it becomes clear that having an
identical jury requirement for crimes and contempts does not make sense:
The maximum punishment for summary contempt must be less than the six-
month standard for ordinary petty crimes.
Nor is it availing to argue that the current minimum standard is
sufficiently low to capture not only the lower risk of deviance for ordinary
crimes, but also the higher risk of deviance for contempt. Such an argument
would maintain that the current doctrine's threshold of six months was
designed to compensate not for an average amount of deviance-namely,
that of ordinary crimes-but rather for the maximum amount of potential
deviance-namely, the magnitude encountered in contempt proceedings.63
But this argument runs directly against the doctrinal origins of the six-
month standard, which the Court derived by setting the petty-serious
threshold at the maximum punishment that colonial statutes permitted to be
judge-adjudicated. Rather than looking to maintain as broad a jury right as
521-23 (spec. ed. 1993); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055,
1064-65 (1964).
61. In this scenario, the stakes of a given crime might be less than six months' imprisonment,
but the rate of potential error would remain sufficiently high that a jury would still be needed to
eliminate a high expected error. Thus, as D increases, only a lower S will yield a sufficiently low
SD such that a jury trial would no longer be needed.
This approach seems to have been considered briefly in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194
(1968). Although the opinion stated that there was "no substantial difference between serious
contempts and other serious crimes," it also followed immediately with the observation that
"[i]ndeed, in contempt cases an even more compelling argument can be made for providing a right
to jury trial as a protection against the arbitrary exercise of official power." Id. at 202.
Unfortunately, it appears that this consideration fell by the wayside after Bloom was decided,
perhaps because there was never a sufficient number of Justices willing to consider the concept
more fully.
62. ld. at 211.
63. Phrased in the terms of note 33, supra, this argument claims that the value of S was set to
account for the maximum value of D: S is set such that SD_, still does not yield an unacceptably
high expected cost.
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possible in order to limit the costs of those crimes most likely to evoke
judicial deviance, the Court instead looked to historical practice to
determine the narrowest jury right across all crimes, and set the petty-
serious threshold at that level. 64
This approach made perfect sense under the Court's assumption that all
crimes had the same expected level of deviance. 65 But, as Part II
demonstrated, this assumption is erroneous when one extends the standard
to contempt. Because the probability of deviance is greater in the contempt
setting, the six-month threshold derived from the expected deviance for
ordinary crimes is inappropriate. Indeed, not only does the theoretical
foundation of Part II support such a conclusion, but the historical behavior
of the legislatures around the time of the Founding does as well.
B. The Historical Distinction Between
Contempt and Other Petty Crimes
The statutory history of contempt around the time of the Founding also
supports the distinction that this Note has drawn between the punishment
for ordinary crimes and for contempt-namely that the latter, because of its
greater temptations for judicial deviance, requires a broader right to jury
trial. During the late colonial period and through the end of the eighteenth
century, contempt was a summary power in the colonies and states. At the
same time, numerous "petty crimes" were prosecuted without the accused
being afforded the right to a jury trial.66 But the punishments that could be
imposed upon contemnors were more strictly limited than those for petty
crimes: Precisely because the denial of a jury right in contempt proceedings
was a more serious hazard, lower stakes were required to offset the higher
risk of self-dealing in such proceedings.
64. As an empirical matter, one could certainly claim that the six-month threshold, in modem
times, is sufficiently high to address even the concerns of contempt. This could be the case if
either: (1) the punitive sanction of six months' imprisonment were not as serious now as it was at
the Founding (effectively decreasing the value of S that results from a six-month threshold), or (2)
the level of expected deviance between judges and juries were, for some reason, lower than at the
time of the Founding (i.e., D were lower now than in the late eighteenth century). Nonetheless, it
is unclear precisely why one would suspect such changes in either D or S to have occurred
between the Founding and today, and the difficulty in measuring (or even detecting) any such
variations would certainly be significant, if not insurmountable, obstacles to any support for such
an objection.
65. That is to say that if D is constant, as the Court assumed, setting S at the highest level
permitted by the colonial legislature would make sense: That level would indicate the maximum
expected cost that the legislature was willing to accept for all crimes. But if the level of D varies,
then the maximum S for one crime may not be appropriate for others. If the legislature assigns a
greater maximum value of S for one category of crimes (ordinary crimes) than for another
(contempt), this may indicate that the legislature understood D to be greater for the latter category
of crime than for the former.
66. For an in-depth description of the type and extent of nonjury adjudication of petty crimes
in some of the states around the time of the Founding, see Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 30.
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Prior to 1800, five states had statutory limits on summary punishment
of contempt, as well as statutory limits on the punishments for petty crimes.
In each state, the maximum punishment allowed for contempt was
significantly lower than the range of punishments permitted for "petty
crimes"-i.e., other crimes adjudicated without provision for a jury trial.
Delaware ensured that any contempt punishment could not exceed a five-
pound fine,67 but at the same time required that petty crimes of up to twelve
pounds be heard by a single justice, 68 and furthermore that cases of adultery
and fornication-subject to a penalty of $160-also be tried by a single
justice.69 Maryland permitted petty criminal punishments of up to £100 or
three months' commitment to a workhouse, 70 but limited contempt to a ten-
pound fine.7 1 South Carolina also limited contempt fines to ten pounds in
most instances, 2 but had judges administer fines of up to £400 for other
offenses.73 Connecticut limited punishment of contempt to a five-dollar fine
or two hours in the stocks,74 but permitted "any matter of criminal nature"
67. An Act Against Drunkenness, Blasphemy; and To Prevent the Grievous Sins of Prophane
Cursing, Swearing, and Blasphemy, 1 Del. Laws 173, 174 (1721); An Act Against Speaking in
Derogation of Courts, 1 Del. Laws 120 (1721). Both of the Acts remained in force at the time of
the Founding. If the parties objected to being tried by a single justice, in some instances-but not
all-they could ask that three freeholders join the justice in his judgment, at the cost of an
additional six shillings.
68. An Act for the More Easy and Speedy Recovery of Small Debts, I Del. Laws 1041
(1792).
69. A Supplement to an Act, Intitled, An Act Against Adultery and Fornication, 1 Del. Laws
1304, 1304-05 (1796). Although a jury verdict could be sought on appeal, the right was only
available to those who paid the fine up-front as a recognizance. The money was not returned until
the accused was acquitted through the appellate process.
70. An Act for the Relief of the Poor in Talbot County, 1811 Md. Laws 547, 552 (authorizing
commitment in a workhouse for up to three months for disorderly conduct, unless security were
given for six months' good behavior); An Act Appointing Wardens for the Port of Baltimoretown,
in Baltimore County, 1811 Md. Laws 470, 472 (instituting a fine of £100 for building wharves
jutting into the channel).
71. An Act for Enlarging the Power of the High Court of Chancery, 1811 Md. Laws 585,
595-96.
72. An Act Confirming and Establishing the Ancient and Approved Method of Drawing
Juries by Ballot in This Province, 1731 S.C. Acts 123. An exception was made for a violent act
committed in the face of the court, in which case a fine "at the discretion of the said court" was
permitted. But it is unclear whether such a punishment was intended for the violent crime itself, or
merely for the contemptuous nature of the crime.
73. An Act for Licensing Hawkers, Pedlars, and Petty-Chapmen, and To Prevent Their
Trading with Indented Servants, Overseers, Negroes and Other Slaves, 1737 S.C. Acts 152. A
1769 act also permitted single justices to impose a penalty of two months in jail. An Act for the
Preservation of Deer, and To Prevent the Mischiefs Arising from Hunting at Unreasonable Times,
1769 S.C. Acts 275, 276. The Act was amended in 1785, however, to require four freeholders to
join in the judgment (although the punishment was also increased to three months, again
suggesting that guarantees of lesser agency deviance permitted greater accompanying penalties).
An Act for Establishing County Courts and for Regulating the Proceedings Therein, 1785 S.C.
Acts 366.
74. An Act Concerning Delinquents, 1808 Conn. Pub. Acts 230, 232. The Act was carried
over from its inception in 1667. The Act also contained a proviso permitting the accused to be
imprisoned or bound over to the next county court. Such pretrial imprisonment-a common
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1242 [Vol. H12: 1223
Why Contempt Is Different
to be tried by a judge alone "where the penalty [did] not exceed the sum of
seven dollars." 75 Finally, New Jersey limited its contempt punishments to
maximum fines of fifty dollars, 76 but permitted justices of the peace to
impose three months of hard labor in other instances.
77
As these examples demonstrate, in early American history the
maximum penalty that could be imposed for petty crimes exceeded the
potential punishment for contempt by a significant margin. This reinforces
the conclusion that contempt is different from ordinary crimes: The
Founders who regulated its punishment recognized the temptations such a
power provided, and limited it accordingly. The judiciary has effectively
overruled this legislative distinction by using a uniform six-month standard
to determine whether any crime is "petty" or "serious," but this does not
diminish the importance of the original colonists' understanding that
contempt should be treated in a different fashion from other crimes. Rather,
it strongly reinforces what has already been noted in Section III.A: The
doctrinal theory exporting the unaltered petty-serious distinction to
contempt is seriously flawed.
The fact that current doctrine differs from the historical treatment of
contempt by colonial legislatures certainly indicates that one of these
approaches is incorrect in its theoretical treatment of contempt. But the
error is the judiciary's, not the legislatures': Judicial fiat cannot remedy the
analytically unsound assumption that contempt is indistinguishable from
other crimes, particularly when that judicial fiat may be motivated precisely
by the institutional bias and self-dealing that distinguishes contempt in the
first place. 8 While the Founders did not extend the popular protections of
the jury to all contempt actions-whether because of expedience or
necessity-they nonetheless implicitly acknowledged that the dangers of
denying such protections were greater for contempt than for other crimes,
and more narrowly prescribed its punishment as a result. This realization,
however, has become lost in the doctrine of the present day.
In choosing to extend the six-month jury threshold to contempt, the
Court claimed that it was ensuring "the firm administration of the law
through those institutionalized procedures which have been worked out
practice among the colonies-was not considered a punishment for conviction, but rather a means
of ensuring the accused would stand trial.
75. id. at 230 (emphasis added). As was the case for contempt in Connecticut, pretrial
detention was permitted in these cases as well.
76. An Act Respecting the Court of Chancery, 1800 N.J. Laws 428, 434. The provision was
designed "to enforce obedience to the process, rules, and orders of the court of chancery,"
suggesting that its limitations may have applied both to civil and criminal contempt. Id.
77. An Act To Describe, Apprehend and Punish Disorderly Persons, 1800 N.J. Laws 410.
78. In fact, the history of the treatment of contempt evinces a frequent defiance of the
legislature by the judiciary, in ways that consistently-and unsurprisingly-favor expansion of
the judiciary's own power. See infra Subsection 1V.C. 1.
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over the centuries., 79 But what the Court failed to realize was that the very
historical procedures upon which it was relying-namely, the use of juries
and the petty-serious distinction for ordinary crimes-had been historically
different for contempt. By ignoring both the theoretical distinction of
contempt from ordinary crimes and the manifestation of that distinction in
historical practice, the Court exported a doctrine that was appropriate for
one criminal context to another in which it was inappropriate. The result
was that, rather than tailoring the jury right to meet the distinct needs and
concerns of contempt, the Court propagated a one-size-fits-all approach that
does neither the jury nor contemnors justice.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS, COSTS, AND THE
UNLIKELIHOOD OF IMPLEMENTATION
Contempt thus differs in a substantial manner from other crimes, and
the difference-a higher potential for deviance between judge and jury-
counsels for a more expansive jury right in criminal contempt proceedings.
The question, then, is what can be done to resolve this problem. This final
Part puts forth proposals-some old, some new-and discusses the costs
that might accompany their implementation, but ultimately arrives at a
disheartening conclusion. Legislative or executive channels could
theoretically provide solutions, but the history of previous attempts to alter
the contempt power suggests that any serious attempt at change is unlikely
to withstand judicial review. The best, and perhaps only, chances to correct
the errors of the current contempt doctrine may lie in the judiciary itself or
in constitutional amendment. Which is to say that, in all likelihood, the
chances are very low indeed.
A. Potential Solutions-Revisions of the Contempt Power
As this Note has attempted to demonstrate, any appropriate alteration of
the current contempt doctrine must recognize both the distinct nature of
contempt and the implications that such a distinction has for the guarantee
of a jury trial in contempt actions. It is clear that there must be some
restriction of the current scope of summary contempt, vis-A-vis the
punishments that can be inflicted at the hands of a single judge. The
difficult question, however, is how far such a change should extend.
Any answer to such a question would depend upon at least one, and
perhaps two, empirical questions: How much more likely is judicial
deviance in cases of contempt than in other crimes, and what costs would
79. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208 (1968).
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changing the current doctrine entail? 80 To answer these questions, however,
would require the measurement of factors that are indeterminate at best. As
a result, this Section does not propose a definitive solution as to how-or
how far-the judiciary's current contempt powers should be curtailed.
Rather, it strives to offer possibilities for practical solutions, and in doing so
tries to articulate more clearly the theoretical inconsistencies that the rest of
this Note has revealed in the current judicial treatment of contempt.
Some commentators have argued for a complete abolition of the
summary contempt power,81 but such a restriction, while perhaps desirable
from a theoretical perspective, is practically unfeasible. Summary contempt
may not be necessary to the extent that it is currently permitted, but some
degree of power must be granted to preserve order and to conduct court
proceedings effectively. Whether the power is called "contempt" or given
another name, some degree of summary control-be it through criminal
contempt, civil contempt, or otherwise-must exist.
One potential solution to alleviate the incentives for self-dealing that
distinguish contempt from other crimes would be to maintain the contempt
power, but vest it in a different adjudicative body. Although some power
must exist for the sake of maintaining courtroom order, it need not
necessarily be vested in the trial judge. In fact, placing such control in the
hands of another courtroom official, rather than the judge himself, may help
to solve the difficulties discussed in Part II. The new repository for the
contempt power might be a preexisting official, such as the bailiff or court
marshal, or a newly created courtroom administrator whose sole duty would
be to define and punish contumacious conduct.
At first glance, such a solution has significant appeal. The quick
resolution of summary adjudication would be maintained, while the power
would also be disaggregated from judges who would have an incentive to
misuse it. But the practical costs and difficulties of creating a separate class
of "contempt judges" to maintain courtroom order may make such a
solution administratively unfeasible. Furthermore, one could argue that the
concerns expressed in Part II would still exist under such a system.
Certainly, the opportunity for self-dealing would persist-albeit perhaps to
a lesser degree-in a set of officials whose power was coextensive with the
limits of contempt: By exercising the contempt power, such officials would
be maintaining and enhancing the scope of their authority. Contemptuous
conduct might not be a direct attack on the authority of a "contempt judge"
80. As to whether the second of these questions is relevant in determining how far to extend
the jury right in contempt proceedings, see infra Section IV.B.
81. E.g., I EDWARD LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON
CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 258-67 (1873); Sedler, supra note 3; see also GOLDFARB, supra note
6, at 302-08 (suggesting a replacement of the summary contempt power-in most instances-with
prosecution for the crime of "misdemeanor to government," to which the usual constitutional
safeguards of criminal prosecution and trial would attach).
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in the way that it is on the trial judge; but as a part of the judiciary, some
degree of institutional bias would most likely be present in the new officials
as well-although perhaps not to the same extent as under the current
system.
As a result, although separate contempt officials might produce some
improvement by reducing the chance of self-dealing and deviance from the
popular will, it is also possible that the decrease would be small compared
to the costs of implementation. A more appropriate and feasible solution
may lie not in transferring the power of contempt to another official, but
rather in making sure that the power is narrowly tailored to what is actually
required to administer justice. In Justice Frankfurter's words, since
necessity has created the summary contempt process, "[n]ecessity must
bound its limits."
82
This second approach-permitting summary contempt to continue in its
current form, but only within a narrow set of circumstances and
punishments-has been suggested often. Many authors have proposed
allowing judges to exclude contemnors from their courtroom or, in cases of
extreme disruption, to imprison them for short periods of time pending a
trial.83 Along the same lines, the extent of the contempt power could be
maintained, but limited to use in instances where the contemnor posed an
immediate threat of endangering those present or disrupting the court's
functions.84 Further proposals have also been suggested for controlling
defendants in court, while still permitting them to remain present for the
proceedings against them; these include "conditional contempt"
(imprisonment that ends when the defendant agrees to behave) 85 as well as
gagging or shackling the defendant-remedies that the Court explicitly
sanctioned in 1970. 86 Yet another, perhaps more extreme possibility would
82. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 36 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
83. E.g., GOLDFARB, supra note 6, at 304-06 (proposing to limit summary contempt to a
period of one day, or for the remainder of any trial disrupted by such a contempt); Richard C.
Brautigam, Constitutional Challenges to the Contempt Power, 60 GEO. L.J. 1513, 1534, 1536
(1972) (recommending a statutory codification of contempt that limits summary contempt to the
power to exclude individuals from the courtroom for disruption ofjudicial proceedings); Braswell,
supra note 54 (suggesting that courts limit contempt to "exceptional circumstances").
84. In theory, summary contempt is limited to those acts that "create[] 'an open threat to the
orderly procedure of the court and such a flagrant defiance of the person and presence of the judge
before the public' that, if 'not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court's
authority will follow."' In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948) (quoting Cooke v. United States,
267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925)). But in practice, this standard--due perhaps to the inherently subjective
nature of what sorts of acts would demoralize the court-has proved to be little more than an
empty limit on the contempt power.
85. "Conditional contempt" might be characterized as a specific subset of civil contempt: The
accused must agree to behave before he will be set free. For the distinction between criminal and
civil contempt, see supra note 7.
86. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970) ("[T]here are at least three constitutionally
permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag
him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom
until he promises to conduct himself properly."). For articles embracing the Allen standard as a
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be to remove a disruptive defendant from the courtroom entirely, permitting
him to view and participate in the trial only through closed-circuit
television and consultations with his attorney.8 7 These solutions, either
alone or in tandem, may be a viable way to ensure that the courtroom does
not become a "debating society," while at the same time limiting
contempt's potential for abuse. Nevertheless, such proposals may also
impose significant dignitary costs upon the contemnor or generate a risk of
fundamentally hamstringing an effective defense at trial-perhaps even to
the point of eliminating one constitutional violation at the expense of
creating another.88
One might also conceive of a compromise that stopped short of
restricting the courts to such a narrow set of contempt powers, while still
expanding the jury right beyond that of ordinary crimes. Such a solution
would entail a reduction in the maximum punishment permitted under
summary contempt. A change of this sort would not only address the
concerns of judicial deviance and self-dealing surrounding the contempt
power, but would also remain faithful to the historical focus of the Court's
petty crimes doctrine: Insofar as colonial legislatures were more restrictive
in prescribing punishments for judge-adjudicated contempts than for other
crimes, a new standard of less than six months would be consonant with the
history that originally gave rise to the petty-serious distinction.89 The degree
of reduction could even vary across states, depending upon structural
differences in judicial systems that might make judges more or less prone to
self-dealing.
90
viable alternative to contempt for defendants, see Richard B. Kuhns, The Summary Contempt
Power: A Critique anda New Perspective, 88 YALE L.J. 39 (1978); Sedler, supra note 3; and The
Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 32, 90-100 (1970) (recommending a "hierarchy of
remedies," from which criminal contempt should be excluded). Other countries, however, have
not been as fond of the method of binding and gagging defendants. One English treatise on
contempt cites Allen as an "extreme (and colourful) example" of the use of physical restraints, and
takes solace in the fact that "[o]ne trusts that in [England] the line will be drawn at handcuffing,
and that any temptation to 'shackle and gag' will be firmly resisted." C.J. MILLER, CONTEMPT OF
COURT 4.127 (2000).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 497 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("When
security is a problem or a dangerous defendant or a group of defendants is involved, the right to be
present can be satisfied by use of closed circuit television and the opportunity to consult with
counsel, if such procedure is considered necessary by the trial court."); ef Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836 (1990) (holding that testimony of a child witness in a child abuse case, administered via
one-way closed circuit television, did not violate the Confrontation Clause when supported by a
case-specific finding of necessity).
88. See, e.g., Craig, 497 U.S. at 860-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. See supra Section III.B.
90. Such structural differences might include whether the judiciary was appointed or elected,
the length of judges' terms of office, and the degree of impeachment power vested in the state
legislature. The difficulty in quantifying the effect of such differences might make this more
ambitious, state-tailored remedy impractical or impossible, however.
A proposal for such a state-by-state scheme is similar-at least in result-to what Justice
Harlan suggested in his dissent in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 192-93 (1968). Harlan,
however, based his argument for interstate variation upon states' differential costs in
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A final potential solution would be to attempt to counteract the bias and
incentives for self-dealing that the contempt power creates, by authorizing
civil or even criminal liability for "malicious contempts."9' Such a solution
would function in a manner similar to a malicious prosecution claim: The
goal would be to attempt to quantify the harms that a judge inflicts when
improperly using his summary contempt powers, and to internalize them by
holding the judge liable to the extent of the harm that his conduct causes.
This solution might be considered radical, insofar as it infringes on the
realm of immunity to which judges have typically been entitled for actions
in their judicial capacities. It might also turn out to be an empty solution if
judges proved unwilling to entertain suits or prosecutions against fellow
members of the judiciary. However, if one wishes to keep the contempt
power at its current strength while still remedying its inconsistency with the
petty crimes doctrine, the abrogation of judicial immunity for "malicious
contempts" might provide a way to counteract contempt's potential for self-
dealing and bias, and to decrease judicial deviance to the level of all other
crimes-thus making a narrower contempt power unnecessary.
B. Considering the Costs of a New Contempt Standard
Regardless of which of the above solutions is chosen, it is clear that
there will be costs that accompany any change in the current standard of
contempt. These may include the administrative costs of conducting more
jury trials, the potential error costs that accompany the heuristic biases of
jury deliberation, or possible underenforcement costs that derive from
judges' decreased willingness to use the contempt power when a jury trial
will result. But while the consideration of these costs may be a useful
exercise, the Court has indicated on numerous occasions that the right to a
jury trial (and, more pointedly, the interest in avoiding the improper
imprisonment that the jury was designed to protect) is incommensurable
administering jury trials, rather than on varying state policies that affected probabilities of judicial
deviance. Such a cost-based justification, however, is arguably an unconstitutional ground for
permitting states to limit the jury right as Harlan proposed. See infra notes 92-98 and
accompanying text.
91. The suggestion of criminal prosecution for improper contempts seems to have been
considered as far back as the late eighteenth century. See Lining v. Bentham, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 1, 6
(1796). The criminal prosecution proposed in that case, however, would have been under the more
general category of "corruption or oppression," making it unclear whether any improper contempt
would be sufficient to provide grounds for prosecution, or only those contempts that could be
shown to have arisen from provable and improper motive.
Regardless, current doctrine does not seem particularly amenable to judicial liability--civil
or criminal-for improper use of the contempt power. See, e.g, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-54 (1967) (expressing concern that an abrogation of the common-law rule of judicial
immunity from suit would inhibit judicial decisionmaking); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
335 (1871) (sustaining judicial immunity from a civil suit arising from a holding of contempt,
regardless of whether the contempt exceeded the judge's jurisdiction or was malicious or corrupt).
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with such costs. Indeed, if one were to consider these costs in determining
how far to extend the jury right, each crime would require a separate
standard. Accordingly, although these cost concerns certainly are relevant
when choosing how to vindicate the jury right in contempt proceedings-
i.e., which solution to select-they cannot determine whether that right
ought to be vindicated in the first place.
There is reason to suspect that the additional administrative costs of
changing the current contempt standard will be significant. Depending on
the solution chosen, these could include the costs of creating a new
department of "contempt judges," the costs of undertaking a greater number
of jury trials, or the costs of limiting a disruptive defendant from exercising
the full panoply of his trial rights. Furthermore, if judges substitute toward
"serious contempts" once their summary contempt powers are undermined,
there might be additional burdens on the jury system-even if the jury's
role is not explicitly expanded by the solution implemented.
Along similar lines, if an alternative decisionmaker-be it another
official or a jury-assumes some of the powers of contempt previously
vested in the trial judge, potential difficulties of bias may arise. While
judges may suffer from institutional bias or incentives to self-deal, the bias
concerns raised by a new decisionmaker would be heuristic in nature,
arising from the fact that such a decisionmaker may be an objectively less-
qualified adjudicator of contempt than the trial judge would be. At the very
least, jurors-as nonprofessional, group decisionmakers-are prone to
heuristic biases that judges are not. But the facts underlying an allegation of
contempt tend to be simple and straightforward, and the trial transcript itself
often provides a verbatim description of the conduct in question. As a
result, it seems doubtful that a jury or any other entity is likely to suffer
such biases to any great degree in the context of contempt. Furthermore, as
Part lI made clear, judges suffer an inherent distortion of self-interest in
contempt proceedings. It is quite possible that even though liabilities in
judgment do exist for alternative decisionmakers, they are dwarfed by the
greater distortion that faces the judge attempting to adjudicate a cause that,
directly or indirectly, affects him personally.
Finally, some of the solutions proposed above-particularly those that
narrow the range of scenarios in which the summary contempt power may
be utilized without providing a new alternative-raise the potential cost of
underutilization of the contempt power after they are implemented. It is
possible that, by restricting the range of permissible instances of contempt,
one might overdeter its use and permit contumacy to go unpunished,
possibly resulting in a general disrespect for the law, as well as a greater
risk of physical harm to those in the courtroom. But the risk of such "costs"
of underutilization inherently depends on one's judgments of whether the
current scope of the contempt doctrine is actually necessary to vindicate the
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power of the courts. If this is not the case, then the specter of these costs
disappears: The narrowing of the contempt power, rather than letting the
guilty go free, actually permits the innocent to remain unfettered by the
unconstitutional bonds imposed by an overzealous judiciary.
Regardless of their respective measures, it is only logical that these
various costs-and their potential magnitudes-should be considered in
selecting a solution to the contempt quandary. They need not, however,
provide a justification for permitting the current, erroneous contempt
doctrine to persist. The constitutional right to a jury trial, guaranteed as a
safeguard against government oppression, must be considered anew when
the potential for oppression is particularly acute, as in the case of contempt.
But it cannot be abridged or curtailed by considerations unrelated to its
purpose, even if those considerations include something as practical as cost.
Indeed, even the judiciary itself has consistently held, in both contempt and
other contexts, that the protections the jury was designed to provide may
not be undermined by considerations of CoSt.
92
In the context of contempt in particular, the Court has acknowledged
and supported the proposition that the costs of jury trial are
incommensurable with its benefits. When it first expanded the right of jury
trial to "serious contempts" in Bloom, the Court explicitly rejected the
argument that efficiency or costs were proper to consider against the
constitutional requirements of jury trials.93 This sentiment has carried all the
way through to the most recent of the Court's major contempt decisions in
International Union.9"
92. It is important to recognize that this is not an argument that jury trials should be granted
in all instances, or that society will never be willing to endure any risk of wrongful punishment.
Clearly, the petty crimes distinction itself disputes this view. Rather, the argument is that the
threshold level of potential wrongful punishment is a fixed amount, independent of the costs of
administration. Expressed in terms of this Note's formal model, see supra note 33, this argument
would declare that SD < K, where K is some fixed threshold quantity of expected wrongful
punishment. While the source of K is somewhat unclear, the Court's reliance on historical practice
and legislation in Duncan and Baldwin suggests that its value may strive to approximate a society-
wide consensus about what magnitude of injustice is intolerable in a free society. That citizens are
willing to endure some degree of injustice in exchange for cheaper judicial administration (thus
producing a positive, nonzero value for K) does not contradict such an argument. Rather, it merely
demonstrates that society is willing to exchange risk for benefits, but only up to a certain point:
Once the risk becomes too great, it also becomes one that is categorically unacceptable.
Put another way, the petty crimes doctrine does consider administrative costs in some
circumstances-namely, for those offenses where expected error costs are sufficiently low. It is
because of these very administrative costs that the jury right does not extend to such trials. Once
the expected costs of punishment exceed some predetermined amount (K), however, the decision
is no longer a cost-benefit analysis, and the right to jury trial becomes absolute. The petty-serious
distinction is a proxy for determining at what point this paradigm shift occurs.
93. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208-09 (1968).
94. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 839 (1994). One might
argue that the Court's reasoning in both International Union and Bloom relied in part upon its
(mistaken) belief in the propriety of wholly exporting the petty-serious distinction to the context
of contempt. The more fundamental recognition of both opinions, however, is that when the need
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In a noncontempt setting, the Court's recent rulings in Apprendi v. New
Jersey95 and Ring v. Arizona96 have similarly demonstrated that
implementation costs may not be grounds on which to obviate the
constitutional right to a jury trial. Both decisions invalidated statutory
regimes in which the determinations of the jury were replaced by that of a
"more efficient" decisionmaker-namely, a judge. The Court ruled the
practices unconstitutional, despite significant-perhaps staggering--costs
that were predicted to and did arise as a result. 97 Accordingly, the costs
surrounding the vindication of the jury trial in contempt proceedings, while
relevant to the method by which it should be achieved, should not be an
objection to implementing the changes needed. In Justice Scalia's words,
the jury trial "has never been efficient; but it has always been free."
98
C. Difficulties Remain-Methods of Implementation
Given the complexity of determining the relative costs that different
corrective measures would entail, it may be difficult to arrive at a consensus
as to which policy should be implemented to solve the theoretical flaws of
current contempt doctrine. But even if a solution were unambiguously
preferable, considerable difficulties would remain in implementing it. It is
unlikely that the judiciary would be sympathetic to such a proposal:
Generally, courts--or any institutions-are loath to take any action that
might jeopardize their power or influence. In such a scenario, either the
executive or legislative branch might attempt to introduce change. But
given prior case history in the realm of contempt, it is unlikely that such a
sweeping change to the current doctrine would survive in the face of
judicial review.
Historically, the judiciary has interpreted the contempt power to be
quite broad, while it has also interpreted the other branches' abilities to
limit that power to be quite narrow. Legislative attempts to alter or
eliminate summary contempt have met with two varieties of judicial
resistance: Some restrictions have been struck down as per se invalid
encroachments on the courts, in violation of separation of powers, while
others have met with judicial interpretations that thwarted their original
intent. Similarly, although the executive pardon power has been permitted
for a jury trial does exist-whether gauged properly by the petty-crime analysis or a modification
thereof-the consideration of costs is not appropriate.
95. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
96. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
97. See id. at 2449-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Apprendi as responsible for 1802
additional criminal appeals in federal court, a 77% increase in second or successive federal habeas
petitions, and 18% of all certiorari claims, as well as predicting further and similar "harm" from
the Court's decision in Ring).
98. Ring, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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for contempts, it is possible that if the power were exercised too broadly (or
with an eye toward effectively eliminating summary contempt), judicial
tolerance would wane. Furthermore, history suggests that it would be highly
unlikely for an executive to pardon contemnors en masse.
1. Reform Through the Legislature
Current doctrine has defined contempt as a power that "cannot be
dispensed with in a Court, because [it is] necessary to the exercise of all
others," 99 and one that is "not immediately derived from statute." 100 As a
result, legislative attempts to limit or eliminate contempt have met with
resistance from the judiciary. Insofar as restricting contempt would affect
the power of the courts, the doctrine has generally developed so that
legislatures may regulate contempt, but only to the extent that such
regulation does not materially affect or infringe upon the contempt power.
"The courts of several states have realized that self-preservation demands
the resistance of every legislative encroachment upon the historical judicial
prerogative of inflicting penalties for contempt,"'' 1 and the federal courts
appear to have done the same.
The Court has occasionally upheld legislation regarding contempt,
102
although in so doing has made explicit the fact that such legislation is only
acceptable if it "does not interfere with the power to deal summarily with
contempts committed in the presence of the court."' 0 3 But even when the
judiciary has upheld such legislation, it has also used its interpretative
authority to limit-and occasionally to undermine-the effects of such
legislation. This tendency is perhaps best demonstrated by the judicial
response to the Judiciary Act of 183 1.104
The Act, prompted by an infamous and well-publicized case of indirect
contempt that eventually lead to the impeachment of the presiding judge,
10 5
limited summary contempts to cases of "misbehaviour of any person or
persons in the presence of the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct
99. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
100. Id. But see In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962) (referring to "the limited powers
of summary contempt which Congress has granted to the federal courts" (emphasis added)).
101. Wilbur Larremore, Constitutional Regulation of Contempt of Court, 13 HARV. L. REV.
615, 616 (1900). This article provides an excellent general summary of early state decisions
limiting legislative encroachments upon the contempt power.
102. For federal limits on the use of summary contempt, see 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2000); and
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). Other limitations on indirect contempts include 18 U.S.C. §§ 3691-3692.
103. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924).
104. An Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts of Court, ch. 99, 4 Star. 487
(1831) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 401).
105. See supra note 23. For more on the case, the subsequent impeachment of Judge Peck,
and the resulting Act of Congress, see CROMWELL HOLMES THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT
OF COURT 25-27 (1934).
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the administration of justice. ' ' 10 6 The intent was primarily to stop summary
punishment of certain indirect contempts-particularly contempts by
publication, which allowed judges to punish any published criticisms of the
judiciary, or particular judges, as they saw fit.
For the next century, however, courts staunchly ignored the Act's
purpose and interpreted "so near thereto" to be a causal restriction on the
summary contempt power, rather than a geographic one.10 7 As a result, the
judiciary held that any contempt-including one by publication-that the
judge determined to be sufficiently obstructive could be summarily
punished, effectively nullifying the 1831 Act. Indeed, the Court expressly
stated that the Act "conferred no power not already granted and imposed no
limitations not already existing. In other words, it served but to plainly
mark the boundaries of the existing authority resulting from and controlled
by the grants which the Constitution made and the limitations which it
imposed."'
0 8
It was only in 1941-110 years after the Act was passed-that the
Court switched its interpretation to one of geographic proximity, removing
contempt by publication from the scope of summary adjudication and
vindicating the original purpose of the statute. 10 9 The extremely long lag
between Congress's solution to the overbreadth of the contempt power and
its recognition by the courts demonstrates the hesitancy with which the
judiciary will restrict its own power at the behest of other branches,
especially in the context of contempt.
This hesitancy becomes particularly suspect when one recognizes that
Congress has a legitimate constitutional power to limit contempts, at least
in the lower federal courts."" Precisely because the ability and discretion to
create those courts rests solely in the hands of Congress, 1 ' it logically
follows that Congress can condition the existence of those courts on a more
restricted contempt power, so long as such a restriction does not limit them
106. § 1, 4 Stat. at 488. The Act also covered contempts committed by officers of the court in
their official capacities, as well as resistance to the court's "lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command." id.
107. See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749 (1929); Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255
(1923); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918); In re Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280
(1889); In re Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889); Kirk v. United States, 192 F. 273 (9th Cir. 1911);
United States v. Anonymous, 21 F. 761 (W.D. Tenn. 1884).
108. Toledo Newspaper Co., 247 U.S. at 418.
109. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
110. There is some question as to whether Congress has the power to limit contempts for all
federal courts, or just for the lower courts, the existence of which is not mandated by the
Constitution. See Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
111. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 ("[Congress shall have the power to] constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."); id. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United
States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.").
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to such an extent that they become something other than courts.' 12 The
Supreme Court itself has recognized this fact, holding that because the
district and circuit courts are products of congressional legislation, "[t]heir
powers and duties depend upon the act calling them into existence, or
subsequent acts extending or limiting their jurisdiction."
' 1 3
As a result of this constitutional entitlement, any attempts by the
judiciary to check federal regulation of contempts (such as the Act of 1831)
should be viewed not only with skepticism, but perhaps also as further
indication of the vested interest with which the judiciary operates in the
realm of contempt. As with no other judicial power, contempt exists in
large part separate from both the legislative and executive branches, making
the potential and opportunity for judicial self-dealing particularly acute.'
t4
Certainly, these further efforts to isolate the court's power from the scrutiny
or checks of the other branches-particularly in contravention of the
Constitution's command-is a serious suggestion that greater oversight, not
less, is needed. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the legislature possesses the
ability to meet such a need. Whether or not the judiciary's effort to thwart
legislative restrictions is a conscious one, history indicates that between
judicial review and judicial interpretation, it is unlikely that the legislative
branch will be able to remedy the problems of the current contempt doctrine
effectively." 5
2. Reform Through the Executive
The executive pardon power, while initially more promising, is also
unlikely to provide a panacea. Although the Court has acknowledged that
contempt, as a crime, can be pardoned by the Executive, i t 6 it is also likely
that the Court would consider extensive use of the pardon power in such a
context to be unconstitutional. In the same case in which it ruled that the
112. For a more elaborate and historically supported version of this argument, see Felix
Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
"Inferior" Federal Courts--a Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010 (1924).
113. Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 511. The "power" in question when the Court elaborated
such a view was none other than the contempt power.
114. Judges may exercise judicial restraint in part because of their concern over legislative
intervention or reversal by higher courts. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 19.7 (5th ed. 1998) (arguing that the main constraint on judges is their sensitivity to
reversal or the potential for legislative intervention). But insofar as contempt is not subject to
legislative regulation without judicial approval, and the judiciary as a whole is likely to approve of
decisions expanding the contempt power (thus yielding a low probability of reversal), such
incentive checks on the judiciary may be substantially smaller in the context of contempt than for
other judicial decisions.
115. One must also keep in mind that the Act of 1831 dealt with indirect contempts only. If
the statute had significantly infringed upon the power of the courts in direct contempts, it is even
more likely that the judiciary-intentionally or not would have undermined or rejected it.
116. See Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
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Executive could pardon contempts, the Court also stated that "[tlo exercise
[the pardon power] to the extent of destroying the deterrent effect of
judicial punishment would be to pervert it .... Our Constitution confers
this discretion on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he will
not abuse it." 1 17 Although the opinion does not explicitly state what the
consequence of nullifying the contempt power through systematic pardons
would be, it suggests that such a use would not be looked upon favorably
by the Court, and might even result in judicial intervention." 8 Certainly, the
current case law does not preclude such a possibility."
9
Furthermore, past practice suggests that the President-or any
executive official-would be unlikely to use the pardon power in such a
sweeping manner. In the first 125 years of the republic, only eighteen
contempt violations were pardoned by the Executive.' 20 In addition, fewer
than half of those pardons dealt with direct contempts: The majority were
for acts committed outside of the courtroom.' 2 Unless there is substantial
and significant popular support for doing so, we can expect that executive
pardon will not be an effective method for remedying the current doctrinal
errors surrounding contempt. The administrative and reputational costs that
the Executive would bear as a result of doing so would likely be too great-
and the rewards too few-to justify such an action, especially for an office
that is so visible and scrutinized as that of the Executive.
3. Reform Through Unlikely Channels
Change, it seems, must therefore come from within the judiciary itself,
or through constitutional amendment. But the latter is extraordinarily
unlikely, given that contempt is an issue of which few lawyers (let alone
ordinary citizens) are fully aware. And the chance of change occurring
through the courts, although possible, is also extremely low.
117. Id. at 121.
I 18. Although issues of the separation of powers might be implicated by executive pardons
of contempt-or by the judiciary's exemption of contempt from executive pardon-the issue has
not been squarely addressed in the doctrine to date. Nor has it been considered for contempt of
Congress, which raises similar concerns. The two cases that come closest to addressing the issue,
however, both hold that contempt is to be construed as an "offense against the United States"
within the meaning of Article 1I and thus pardonable by the President. In this regard, the authority
of the Executive is seen as coextensive with that of the King of England, who could pardon both
contempt of court and contempt of Parliament. Grossman, 267 U.S. 87; In re Mullee, 17 F. Cas.
968 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869) (No. 9911).
119. For an argument that the Executive should have no pardon power at all in the context of
contempt, see Larremore, supra note 101, at 620-23. Larremore argues that "[t]he recognition of
the power of pardon... tends to make the courts creatures of executive will or caprice, and, in
like mainer as the concession of the authority of the legislature to regulate contempt, to disturb
the theoretical adjustment of the American governmental tripod." Id. at 623.
120. THOMAS, supra note 105, at 97.
121. Id.
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As much of this Note has shown, judicial influence and power are
inextricably linked to contempt: For the judiciary to undermine that power
by restricting contempt's summary process would be as unlikely as it would
be uncharacteristic of courts' previous behavior. It is true that, for a brief
moment in 1963, the Court seemed willing to put its own interests aside and
to modify the doctrine of contempt to conform to the guarantees of the
Constitution. But unfortunately, the turn that it chose to take-while
certainly a vast improvement-was still erroneous. As a result, contempt
continues to lack the full extent of jury protection that it merits. And,
barring an unprecedented shift in judicial disposition, such a deficiency is
likely to persist-despite the constitutional guarantees to the contrary.
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